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ABSTRACT
Previous research consistently shows that homeowners accumulate more
wealth compared with tenants. In this paper, we describe the size of this
‘tenure wealth gap’ for 10 European countries. Furthermore, we explain why
the size of the tenure wealth gap differs between countries by including
cross-level interactions between institutional variables and housing tenure in
a series of country-fixed effects regression models. Cross-country differences
arise as the costs of owning versus renting, as well as the profitability of
homeownership versus other investments, differ along the lines of welfare
policies and housing regime arrangements. We attempt to control for selec-
tion bias related to tenure status by using propensity score matching techni-
ques, using data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey
(HFCS). Our findings suggest that the tenure wealth gap is largest in familial-
istic welfare states, in which marginalised tenants are unable to save, whereas
homeownership is a family resource that provides an in-kind retirement
income (‘passive’ asset-based welfare). We find smaller tenure wealth gaps in
countries with a financialised promotion of homeownership, where housing
wealth functions as a privatised welfare arrangement (‘active’ asset-based wel-
fare). The smallest tenure wealth gaps occur in countries with more afford-
able rental housing, allowing tenants to accumulate savings.
KEYWORDS Housing wealth; homeownership; net worth; saving; life course
Introduction
The finding that homeowners have higher net worth than renters is well-
known (Belsky, Retsinas, & Duda, 2007; Di, Belsky, & Liu, 2007; Haurin, Parcel,
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& Haurin, 2002; Lersch & Dewilde, 2018; Turner & Luea, 2009). Net worth is
the sum of financial wealth and housing wealth, minus any (residential)
debts. With every year in homeownership, a household’s net worth increases
due to mortgage amortisation and house price inflation (Di et al., 2007). Even
though gains and losses in the housing market tend to be unequally distrib-
uted across space and social groups (Hamnett, 1999; Wind & Hedman, 2018),
similar positive results in the long run are found for low- and middle-income
owners – who generally buy cheaper properties on less attractive locations
(Turner & Luea, 2009). Homeowners are furthermore found to have higher
levels of financial wealth than tenants (Pryce & Keoghan, 2002). Hence, hous-
ing wealth and financial wealth do not operate like communicating vessels.
This paper explains why this tenure wealth gap is larger in some countries
than in others, and especially highlights institutional explanations associated
with the welfare state and the housing system.
On the individual level, different explanations have been advanced for the
finding that homeowners have higher net worth compared with tenants. First,
‘different’ people select into homeownership. Mortgaged homeownership
requires a stable income and employment position, and is therefore more
common among people in a better socio-economic position. Thus, higher lev-
els of net worth follow general stratification patterns and their cumulative
causation over the life course. However, the positive effect of tenure on net
worth remains after controlling for the socio-economic status of the house-
hold. Time-constant, unobserved ‘latent’ characteristics of people determining
the decision to become a homeowner (e.g. personality, lifestyle and consump-
tion preferences, psychological or physical condition) might influence their
higher propensity to accumulate non-housing wealth (e.g. Dietz & Haurin,
2003; Zavisca & Gerber, 2016). Keister, Benton, and Moody (2016), for instance,
identified distinct ‘expenditure lifestyles’ which transcend well-established
socio-demographic associations with consumer spending. Thus, people who
select into homeownership may be more likely to save (more) to start with. In
order to better evaluate the potential impact of owning versus renting itself
on the tenure wealth gap, more advanced statistical modelling techniques
such as Propensity Score Matching are required (see further).
Homeowners may accrue financial wealth beyond their original means
and gain advantages compared to tenants for several reasons. These
‘substantive’ pathways are based on savings behaviour and economic bene-
fits derived from homeownership. Soaita and Searle (2016) argue that
homeownership should be considered as one of the most effective
enforced saving schemes: Whereas savings for tenants are non-committal
and a failure to keep up with rent payments ‘only’ results in eviction (Quigley
& Raphael, 2004), ‘savings in stone’ are mandatory for homeowners. A failure
to keep up with monthly interest and amortisation payments is penalised
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with both a loss of the house and of potential future housing wealth.
Households might also start to actively save (more) additional resources once
they enter homeownership, and thus enhance their financial wealth position,
e.g. to fund renovation and maintenance; to create a financial buffer against
income loss; or because the experience of saving for homeownership posi-
tively influences goal-directed saving for other purposes/general life-course
planning (Lersch & Dewilde, 2018). Finally, as there is a positive association
between parents’ and children’s homeownership, homeowners tend to
receive larger gifts, (informal) loans and inheritances, which in turn contrib-
utes to greater wealth accumulation (see Helderman & Mulder, 2007).
In this paper, our focus lies with the economic benefits derived from
homeownership, in particular those derived from government regulations,
policies, and subsidies that favour homeownership over rental housing
(Kemeny, 1981; Quigley & Raphael, 2004). A major reason why homeowners
financially outperform tenants is because house price inflation has historically
outpaced the consumer price index. However, cross-country variation in the
extent to which house prices outperform the consumer price index is largely
the result of government regulations, policies and subsidies. While the
above-mentioned country studies document the existence of tenure wealth
gaps across the western world, they do not systematically investigate or
explain international differences regarding the size of the tenure wealth gap.
In this study, we therefore explicitly focus on the macro-level and study the
international variation regarding the size of the tenure wealth gap. Which
institutional mechanisms explain why homeowners accumulate more hous-
ing and financial wealth in some contexts than in others?
Explaining cross-country differences regarding the size of the tenure
wealth gap on the basis of institutional differences starts from Kemeny’s
(1981) claim that an interaction between ideology and policy produces the
‘superiority’ of homeownership. Larger tenure wealth gaps are rooted in
policy systems that favour homeownership ideologically, and therefore
incentivise households to move into homeownership and accumulate hous-
ing wealth. These incentives entail that homeowners can 1) invest more in
housing or other financial products, or 2) receive a higher rate of return on
their investments. Subsidies clearly effectuate the former, whereas the dec-
ade-long fixation on house price growth brings about the latter (Crouch,
2009; Hay, 2009). It is important to note that the data used in this paper are
collected at a ‘historic low’ of the European housing market, a few years
after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Findings regarding the benefits of
homeownership over renting may therefore be on the conservative side.
The main aim of this paper is to identify and explain the size of tenure
wealth gaps in a range of European countries representing different hous-
ing and welfare regimes. The empirical analyses are based on the
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Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) of the European
Central Bank (ECB), carried out in 2010/11. The country selection is
restricted to a group of 10 Eurozone countries monitored by the ECB, with
a sufficiently large sample size (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France,
Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, and Finland).
To explain cross-country differences regarding the size of the tenure
wealth gap, we control as far as possible for social selection on the micro-
level (i.e. the observable and unobservable propensities associated with both
households’ homeownership and wealth accumulation). We do so in order to
better separate causation from selection- and composition-effects (Zavisca &
Gerber, 2016). Our sample exists of an equal number of tenants and home-
owners in each country, given that we use a propensity score matching
procedure that links every renting household (one-to-one) to an owning
household on the basis of shared characteristics (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002).
This means, however, that in countries with a small and more ‘stigmatised’
rental sector, the selected sample of homeowners is not representative for
the overall home-owning population. Again, findings regarding the benefits
of homeownership over renting may therefore be on the conservative side.
Thanks to this procedure we are able to carry out a quasi-experiment in
which we approximate randomisation by investigating the wealth out-
comes for a treatment group (homeowners) and a control group (tenants).
Iacus, King, and Porro (2012) argue that, as it is likely that the observed
characteristics used in the matching procedure are associated with the
unobserved ones, the likelihood that the latter are balanced out is higher,
and hence is the potential to take care of unobserved heterogeneity.
Regarding this more ‘household-specific’ selection bias arising from time-
constant propensities (e.g. personality, lifestyle and consumption preferen-
ces), we further pragmatically assume that any selection that remains (after
implementing our matching procedure) is more are less similar across
European countries, and hence forms a ‘constant’ part of the otherwise
varying tenure wealth gaps. It is important to note that the social selection
into homeownership is partly the outcome of (historic) housing policies
and market regulations, which are the main explaining mechanisms on the
macro-level. Only the part that varies between countries is relevant to this
study, as it responds to changes in housing and welfare arrangements. We
estimate country-fixed effects regression models (see M€ohring, 2012) to
investigate the impact of various housing and welfare regime arrangements
on the tenure wealth gap, after controlling for the above-mentioned forms
of selection.
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Tenure wealth gaps in Europe
The tenure wealth gap is the country-specific aggregated difference in net
worth (housing and non-housing wealth minus [residential] debts) between
tenants and homeowners with similar socio-economic household character-
istics. The tenure wealth gap is the sum of the housing wealth gap and the
financial wealth gap. The housing wealth gap itself is not further investi-
gated because tenants by definition have no housing wealth. The total
wealth gap is further investigated to account for the different composition
of the wealth portfolio of tenants (savings and financial investments) and
homeowners (savings, financial investments and housing wealth). Hence, a
large tenure wealth gap in favour of homeowners exists when they have 1)
more savings than tenants, or 2) when their financial and housing wealth
holdings together are larger than the savings of tenants. To determine
which of both drivers is the major cause of tenure wealth gaps in different
countries, we distinguish between the total ‘tenure wealth gap’ (TWG) and
the ‘tenure financial wealth gap’ (TFWG).
In the remainder of this section, we discuss policies surrounding home-
ownership, rental housing and pensions in all 10 countries under observation.
Their orientation impacts upon the opportunity to accumulate wealth and the
necessity to save for tenants and homeowners, and is expected to explain
cross-national variations regarding the size of the TWG and the TFWG.
Homeownership policies
Since WWII, many European countries have promoted homeownership
based on the ideology that this tenure holds positive externalities for soci-
ety (Ronald, 2008). The major government interventions since WWII, con-
struction subsidies, subsidies for the costs of borrowing capital (e.g. tax
deductions) and, in a later stage, mortgage market deregulations, have
reduced the out-of-pocket expenses for investments in homeownership,
but have driven up house prices, and consequently influenced the profit-
ability of investments in housing (Angelini, Laferrere, & Weber, 2013).
Table 1 shows the current taxation of homeownership and the expan-
sion of homeownership among lower-income deciles as indicators of the
government promotion of homeownership. Historically, Germany, Austria
and Switzerland have been less engaged in promoting homeownership
than most other Western-European countries (Matznetter, 2002).
Homeownership in these countries is considered a rural housing tenure
(associated with self-construction), whereas a majority of the urbanites lives
in rental housing. Tax benefits for landlords are however considerable,
which increases the attractiveness of owning rental housing (see Bourassa
& Hoesli, 2010 on Switzerland). In countries such as Belgium, France and
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Finland homeownership was (and is still) promoted as part of the establish-
ment of the post-war welfare state. These countries favour homeownership
by means of fiscal benefits (such as mortgage-interest tax deductions) and
(indirect) subsidies (e.g. on construction, or on mortgage loans). In these
countries, the entry into homeownership is generally mortgage-funded,
allowed for by the higher loan-to-value ratios compared to the German-
speaking rental societies. Outright homeownership results in lower monthly
expenses in later life, reducing the need for generous second-tier occupa-
tional pension schemes. Therefore, (subsidised) homeownership can be
considered an integral component of the welfare state (De Decker &
Dewilde, 2010). The most favourable tax treatment of homeownership can
be found in the Netherlands, where mortgage-interest relief is far larger
than all taxes on homeownership together (Hilbers, Banerji, Shi, &
Hoffmaister, 2008). However, the promotion of Dutch homeownership has
started much later (in the 1980s) than in the before-mentioned Western-
European countries. The Mediterranean countries are characterised by an
exceptionally high homeownership rate, without having a longstanding
tradition of homeownership promotion. As argued by Allen (2006), home-
ownership became the dominant tenure thanks to a high tolerance towards
informal self-construction and the absence of social housing provision.
Although homeownership is currently taxed moderately, homeownership is
widespread among the lower income deciles, resulting from an historic
absence of regulation and the prominent role of the extended family in the
provisioning of housing. In recent years, a combination of a stricter approach
to informal construction and a lack of rental alternatives has led to an
increase of late home-leaving and multi-generational living (Allen, 2006).
Deregulation of mortgage markets has occurred across Europe, but only
a subsample of countries geared towards a fully financialised model of
homeownership provisioning in the 1990s (in our dataset: the Netherlands,
Spain, and to a lesser extent Portugal). The deregulation of mortgage mar-
kets allowed lower middle-class households to enter homeownership as it
increased loan-to-income and loan-to-value ratio’s, given larger risk-taking
by financial institutions (Schwartz & Seabrooke, 2008). The financialised pro-
visioning of homeownership has impacted upon housing market dynamics
in especially Northwestern Europe (The Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
Ireland and Scandinavia). It has increased the turnover rate on the housing
market (van der Heijden, Dol, & Oxley, 2011) and boosted house prices
(OECD, 2014). However, the economic crisis of 2008 has caused house
prices to fall much more in countries with liberal housing finance than
in others. The stricter credit provision after the crisis has halted the
growth of homeownership. Whereas those who entered the market for
homeownership before the introduction of liberal housing finance have
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made windfall profits, those who bought in the run-up to the crisis might
still be confronted with larger debts than the value of their homes. A more
conservative model of homeownership finance can be found in the
Mediterranean countries (except for Spain and Portugal) and the German-
speaking countries. In such a system, required down-payments are high,
which makes people enter homeownership at a relatively late moment in
the life course (see Kurz [2004] for Germany) or to obtain housing via the
family (see Allen [2006] for the Mediterranean countries). The conservative
housing finance system has contributed to a stable development of house
prices in the German-speaking countries, as the turnover rates in the hous-
ing market are lower than in other countries, and the purchasing power of
buyers is not artificially boosted (as is the case in countries with a liberal
housing finance system). Although house prices might be lower in coun-
tries with a conservative housing finance system, this does not mean that
homeowners accumulate less housing wealth. On the contrary, because less
households prolong the amortisation of their mortgage, they might accu-
mulate more housing wealth (Wind, Lersch, & Dewilde, 2017).
Both the subsidisation of homeownership and the liberalisation of the
mortgage market initially contributed to the accessibility of homeownership
and subsequently contributed to wealth accumulation among homeowners
who (1) have been able to invest more, or (2) have profited more from
house price inflation. The low penalty on debt prolongation in liberal mort-
gage markets might simultaneously suppress housing wealth of lower
socio-economic groups due to the prominence of residential debts. The
above-mentioned considerations result in the following two hypotheses:
H1a: The tenure wealth gap is larger in countries with a tradition of
preferential taxation of homeownership.
H1b: The tenure wealth gap is smaller in countries with a tradition of
financialised promotion of homeownership.
Rental policies
The housing-costs-to-income-ratio is mostly higher for private renters than
for homeowners, even after controlling for the income level (Dewilde & De
Decker, 2016). Evidence shows that the rent-to-income ratio is lower in inte-
grated rental markets than in dualist rental markets (see Kemeny, 1981). In
the first type of rental market, social housing providers compete with pri-
vate landlords, and private rents are regulated or capped. In the second
type of housing market, social housing caters for the weakest socio-
economic groups only, and rent-setting in the private rental sector is more
deregulated. Hence, in an integrated rental market, tenants can (1) afford
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larger or more expensive rental units that would be unaffordable without
market regulation or (2) accumulate savings due to a relatively low rent-to-
income ratio. French evidence suggests that residing in social housing
speeds up the transition into homeownership since it allows tenants to
accumulate some wealth that can be used as a down-payment (Goffette-
Nagot & Sidibe, 2016).
The size of the social rental sector and the regulation of the private rental
sector differ across European countries (see Table 1). In the Mediterranean
countries, rental housing is a relatively uncommon and social housing is
nearly absent. Homeownership, traditionally provided through the family, is
the norm. Social housing is stigmatised and caters for households with a
minimum income. The German-speaking and Northwestern-European coun-
tries have relatively large rental sectors. Germany and Switzerland have large,
but regulated private rental sectors (rent caps, regulated yearly rent
increases) with consequently moderate rent-to-income ratios. Austria, The
Netherlands, France and Finland have moderately-sized rental sectors, but a
considerable share consists of social housing (Housing Europe, 2015). In
Austria and the Netherlands, the social housing sector has until recently
been open to a large part of the population, but has recently become the
domain of lower-income households. Belgium, France and Finland are histor-
ically characterised by a dualist rental market.
The degree of rent regulation is reflected in the rent-to-income ratio. On
the basis of EU-SILC (Statistics on Income and Living Conditions)-informa-
tion, Table 1 shows that rental housing is least affordable in Greece and
Finland, moderately affordable in countries with large social housing sectors
such as France and the Netherlands, and most affordable in Germany and
Austria with regulated rents. Altogether, we expect tenants to save more
where rent-to-income ratios are lower. Therefore, the tenure financial
wealth gap is expected to be smaller in these countries, which in turn
reduces the gap between tenants and homeowners in terms of total net
worth. Whilst in these countries the social housing sector tends to contain
more middle-income households (who are hence able to save more), such
effects are controlled for with our research design. In other words, our
hypothesis and estimated results only pertain to differences arising from
differences in the cost of housing for otherwise-similar individuals.
H2: The tenure financial wealth gap is larger in countries with less affordable
rental housing and/or smaller social rental sectors.
Pension arrangements
The welfare state can be conceptualised as a provider of ‘transfer wealth’:
employees pay a share of their income to the treasury to provide them
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with the expectation of a guaranteed income in periods of unemployment
and sickness, or in old age (De Swaan, 1988). Therefore, the post-war
expansion of the welfare state has partly crowded out households’ precau-
tionary private savings. Since the 1980s, the reverse is happening. Welfare
responsibilities are increasingly shifted from the state to the individual,
which is assumed to have increased the importance of asset-based welfare
(Crouch, 2009). We distinguish between three types of asset-based welfare
(ABW): passive ABW, active ABW and pro-active ABW (Doling & Ronald,
2010; Ronald, Lennartz, & Kadi, 2017).
The passive form of asset-based welfare lays at the foundation of an
alleged trade-off between homeownership and welfare (Kemeny, 1981).
Homeownership might function as a supplement to low second-tier1 public
or private pension arrangements, as the financial room to contribute to col-
lective schemes is small because it competes with mortgage amortisation,
whereas the need for generous second-tier pensions is small due to low
housing costs after the amortisation of the mortgage (Castles, 1998). For
most homeowners, first-tier (mostly) PAYG2 pensions more or less suffice to
sustain their livelihood after retirement. Ronald et al. (2017) describe the
imputed income3 from homeownership after the amortisation of the mort-
gage and house price inflation as the classic, passive form of asset-based
welfare (ABW). As countries differ regarding the organisation of the second
pillar of their pension system (private/public, occupational/universal, man-
datory/voluntary), the need for assets and the opportunity to accumulate
wealth differ as well. Passive asset-based welfare can be found in the
Mediterranean countries, and some of the Western-European countries such
as Belgium and France, where the state has promoted mortgaged homeown-
ership rather than (mostly mandatory) occupational pension funds.
The active form of ABW allows households to tap into their housing
wealth to cover their welfare needs. Therefore, they need to liquidate the
value of their home by (1) moving into rental housing or a smaller home, or
(2) taking a reversed mortgage on their primary residence to supplement
second-tier pensions. Especially in North-Western Europe (Scandinavia, Britain
and Ireland, the Netherlands and the German-speaking countries), these
strategies are implemented in the welfare state. Only where liberal housing
finance has become a cornerstone of the housing regime, and where occupa-
tional pensions are partly commodified, active asset-based welfare (on the
macro level) could gain ground (in the dataset: the Netherlands).
The pro-active form of ABW is not associated with the primary residence,
but with rental income from secondary properties. Especially in insurance-
based welfare states with a fragmented occupational second-tier pension
system (such as the German-speaking countries, Belgium and France), occu-
pational groups that are not well-covered by social security, such as the
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self-employed, traditionally engage in private small-scale landlordism (De
Decker & Dewilde, 2010; Soaita, Searle, McKee, & Moore, 2017). During
working life, income from entrepreneurship is invested in purchasing one
or more properties that yield rental income for their owners after retire-
ment. In contrast, the upswing of buy-to-let landlordism in the liberal wel-
fare regime may have very different foundations. For the UK, Soaita et al.
(2017) indicate that private landlordism and buy-to-let activities are mostly
a pure investment strategy, speculating on house price inflation, sometimes
coupled to intergenerational support to children whose entry into home-
ownership is impeded due to house price inflation.
How the three forms of asset-based welfare affect the size of the tenure
wealth gap is dependent on the savings behaviour of tenants and owners
in these contexts. Following the logic of the classic trade-off between
homeownership and pensions (passive ABW), transfer capital crowds out
housing wealth on the macro-level. In countries with less generous second-
tier pension arrangements (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Portugal) or less gener-
ous unemployment benefits (e.g. Italy, Greece, Finland)4, precautionary
savings (in the form of housing wealth or financial wealth) are more
needed for both tenants and homeowners, as transfer capital cannot cover
all welfare risks. Outright homeowners on the other hand benefit from an
income-in-kind in old age. Theoretically, this implies that the TWG, but
especially the TFWG is smaller in countries with a smaller welfare state. In
countries with more generous second-tier pension arrangements (e.g. the
Netherlands, Spain, Italy), or unemployment benefit systems (e.g. Belgium,
the Netherlands, Spain), precautionary savings are less needed. Therefore,
housing wealth and financial wealth should be considered more as invest-
ments rather than welfare arrangements in these contexts. As the necessity
to save is lower in these contexts, we hypothesise that tenants do not
accumulate as much financial wealth as homeowners accumulate hous-
ing wealth.
H3a: The tenure wealth gap is larger in countries with generous and universal
welfare arrangements, in particular generous mandatory pension systems.
Active and pro-active asset-based welfare are part of a narrative that
enables households to cater for their long-term welfare needs by investing
in skills and assets throughout the life course (Lennartz & Ronald, 2017).
Life-course oriented ‘social investment strategies’ focus on the employabil-
ity of workers from an individual and life-course perspective, with high
employment of all household members contributing to the ability to sus-
tain larger mortgages and longer mortgage terms. For those who follow
this trajectory, high levels of (private) welfare provisioning are complemen-
tary with high levels of wealth. Housing assets are key in this process
because they represent the largest source of wealth for most households
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and because it is generally supported by the state (it can be considered a
welfare arrangement itself). The active and pro-active forms of ABW has
become more popular in liberal and social-democratic welfare states. In the
conservative welfare state, pro-active forms of ABW have always been
popular among the self-employed as they are poorly covered by the wel-
fare state. The consequence for those who do not follow the ‘golden’ route
of wealth accumulation might be poverty in case negative life course
events occur (Emmenegger, H€ausermann, Palier, & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2012). It
is likely that active and pro-active asset-based welfare increase disparities in
society, or perpetuate them in later life, as only those who have the means
to invest in properties receive in-kind income supplements or rental income
(Dewilde & Raeymaeckers, 2008).
In Table 1, the generosity of the welfare state is assessed. The indicators
only partly capture the difference between Northern- and Southern-
European countries regarding the implementation of social investment
strategies. However, together they show the generous but stratified nature
of the conservative German-speaking welfare states, the small second-tier
pensions in several Mediterranean countries and the funded nature of
second-tier pensions in countries such as the Netherlands and Spain. Earlier
we expected the tenure wealth gap to be larger in countries with more
generous welfare state arrangements, and in particular generous second-
tier mandatory pension systems. In these countries, housing wealth and
transfer capital furthermore do not operate like communicating vessels.
This allows homeowners to accumulate housing wealth on top of other
forms of wealth, whereas tenants do not need to accumulate as much pre-
cautionary savings.
H3b: The tenure financial wealth gap is larger in countries that restructured their
welfare state in a more productivist direction (through social investment strategies).
Data and methods
The empirical work is based on the Household Finance and Consumption
Survey (HFCS), conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB) in 2010/11 in
15 European countries. We exclude Malta, Cyprus, Luxemburg, Slovenia
and Slovakia due to a small sample size among tenants. The HFCS provides
multiple imputations (five in total) to overcome the problem of item
non-response on questions about income and wealth. The sample is repre-
sentative for the adult population (ECB, 2013). In total, 62.000 households
are included in the dataset. The Netherlands has the smallest sample
(1.301), France the largest (15.006).
The analysis sample is restricted to households aged 35 years and older,
as moves into homeownership (and thus: tenure choice) generally take
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place before or around the age of 35 (Angelini et al. 2013). By excluding
relatively young households, we exclude tenants with disproportionally
high financial wealth holdings due to savings for a mortgage down pay-
ment. As our analysis compares wealth holdings of tenants and homeown-
ers, we exclude tenant-owners (Hulse & McPherson, 2014) who own real
estate that is not their primary residence (4% of the sample).
Our analytical sample is the result of a one-to-one nearest-neighbor pro-
pensity score matching (PSM) procedure (without replacement) to create a
‘balanced’ dataset with an equal number of tenants and homeowners,
allowing us to control for selection (omitted variable bias) more thoroughly.
The analysis can be seen as a ‘quasi-experiment’ that resembles a rando-
mised control trial (Austin, 2011). The PSM procedure matches every renting
household to its ‘nearest neighbor’ in the same country (within a range of
pre-defined propensity score calipers) on the basis of income, age, educa-
tional level, marital status and immigrant background (Austin, 2014). When
a home-owning household is matched to a renting household, it is no lon-
ger available as match for another household (matching without replace-
ment). Due to the one-to-one nearest-neighbor PSM procedure, the sample
is reduced with around 60 percent, although the sample is reduced more in
countries with a small rental sector, as fewer matches are available. The
quasi-experiment shows how much wealth tenants would have accumu-
lated if they had made another tenure choice. Although the social selectiv-
ity of rental housing in the countries under observation may still partly
influence the results, this is controlled for in the country-fixed-effects
regression analysis. As explained before, we mainly resort to matching
because we want to better control for the fact that people who select into
homeownership may be more likely to save to start with, and such unob-
servable personality traits potentially vary across countries. In any analysis,
we control for the variables that are used during the PSM procedure as there
is some variance left after the procedure, given that the matched households
are similar to each other, but not identical. The results of these control varia-
bles cannot be interpreted, as the largest share of the variance is removed
due to their usage in the matching operation (Blackwell, Iacus, King, & Porro,
2009). This thus implies that our models have a very low explained variance;
this is however of no consequence as interpretation is meaningless.
Micro-level variables
Household (total) net worth and financial wealth are used to operationalise
the tenure wealth gap. Net worth is measured as the self-assessed sum of
savings, investments in bonds and stocks, the value of the owned home
and other real estate, minus outstanding (mortgage) debts. Unfortunately,
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the HFCS does not include information on pension wealth, as its meaning
and measurement is very complex and dependent on the welfare regime.
Instead, we include macro-level information on pension generosity to inves-
tigate the impact on the TWG. Financial wealth is net worth minus housing
wealth (for tenants: equal to net worth). For both variables, multiple impu-
tations (five in total) provide estimates for households with missing infor-
mation. The imputations are based on an algorithm that predicts the scores
of missing values, by providing five different estimates centred around the
average score within the population. The advantage of using this technique
is that the imputations do not alter the results, but reduce the standard
errors (Rubin, 2004).
The variable ‘tenure status’ differentiates between tenants (residing in
rental housing/rent-free accommodation), mortgaged homeowners and
outright homeowners. As we do not have information about residence in
social housing on the micro-level, the size of this sector is added to the
analysis as a macro-level variable.
To estimate the ‘net’ effect of tenure on net worth/financial wealth, we
control for the covariates that are used to carry out the one-to-one nearest-
neighbor matching procedure, and are associated with both the process of
wealth accumulation and tenure choice: gross income (net income is
unavailable in the HFCS), educational status of the household reference per-
son (primary, lower-secondary, higher-secondary and tertiary education),
immigrant status, age of the oldest person in the household, household
size and the receipt of a financial gift (>5000 euro).
Macro-level variables
Three variables measure the support for homeownership: the taxation of
homeownership (Eurostat, 2015), the loan-to-value ratio (European
Mortgage Federation [EMF], 2013), and the homeownership rate among
lower-income groups. We acknowledge that the size of the tenure wealth
gap is rather the outcome of historic housing policies than the current
regulatory framework. Therefore, the homeownership rate among low-
income households is used to approximate historic policies that have con-
tributed to promoting homeownership. Furthermore, the loan-to-value ratio
– used to identify countries with a more liberal housing finance system –
might be downwardly affected by the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.
However, Table 1 sets countries that have geared towards a financialised
promotion of homeownership clearly apart from the rest. The nature of the
rental sector is operationalised by means of two indicators: the size of social
housing relative to the total housing stock (Housing Europe, 2015), and the
median share of net income spent on rent in a country, based on
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information aggregated from EU-SILC. The structure of the welfare state is
operationalised by means of three indicators: the wealth of mandatory-pri-
vate and public first- and second-tier pension funds relative to the size of
national income (OECD, 2015), the generosity of unemployment benefits
(based on coverage, contributions and replacement rates) (Scruggs, Jahn, &
Kuitto, 2014), and welfare state-related taxes and social contributions as part
of the national income (Rogers & Philippe, 2014). Although the theoretical
argument connects pension generosity to investments in homeownership,
we include two additional welfare state indicators as a robustness check.
Methods
First, we provide descriptive information on the size of the tenure wealth
gap and the tenure financial wealth gap in each of the 10 countries under
observation. The size of the gap is measured as a ratio between net worth/
financial wealth of tenants and homeowners (before the matching proced-
ure). Besides, the tenure wealth gap is presented as a ‘controlled ratio’
between tenants and homeowners. The controlled ratio is the size of the
effect of tenure on net worth/financial wealth, after the matching proced-
ure and controlling for the remainder of the variance related to the varia-
bles used for the matching procedure (income, age, educational level,
marital status and immigrant status). The latter procedure singles out the
share of the tenure wealth gap that could be considered the result of ten-
ure choice among otherwise-similar households, rather than of different
types of selection (as discussed earlier). Both measures are displayed graph-
ically (Figures 1 and 2).
Second, we present country-fixed-effects regression analyses, estimating
the effect of housing tenure on net worth and financial wealth. In these
analyses, we control for all unobserved heterogeneity at the country-level
(M€ohring, 2012). This means that even if we were not able to include all
variables explaining the accumulation of wealth on the micro-level, they
are controlled for on the country-level. We further estimate how different
institutional characteristics impact upon the size of the TWG and the TFWG,
by including an interaction between housing tenure and the above-men-
tioned macro-level institutional variables. The interaction terms show to
what extent country differences regarding the controlled ratio are associ-
ated with the promotion of homeownership, the organisation of the rental
sector, or the organisation of the welfare state (generosity). Analyses are
carried out on five implicates containing imputations and are combined
using Stata’s multiple imputation package. Due to the structured nature of
the HFCS, all results are presented with robust standard errors to allow
residuals to vary in a non-random way.
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Results
Describing the tenure wealth gap
Figure 1 shows the size of the tenure wealth gap in ten Eurozone countries
as 1) the ratio between the wealth holdings of tenants and homeowners
regarding net worth based on the entire sample, and 2) the homeowner-
ship-effect on net worth, after the PSM procedure, and controlling for cova-
riates (income, education, age, marital status, immigrant status, the receipt
of a financial gift). The effect size is derived from regression analyses with
net worth as dependent variable and can be understood as a ‘controlled
Figure 1. Tenure wealth gaps in 10 European countries.
Figure 2. Tenure financial wealth gaps in 10 European countries.
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ratio’ (as the effects denotes the difference between tenants and home-
owners). Figure 2 describes the size of the tenure financial wealth gap in a
comparable manner. First, the size of the tenure financial wealth gap is
expressed as uncontrolled ratio, second as a ‘controlled ratio’.
We highlight three conclusions that can be drawn on the basis of
Figure 1. First, in all ten Eurozone countries under observation, homeown-
ers have higher levels of net worth than tenants. Even after the PSM pro-
cedure and controlling for the remaining variance in the control variables,
the effect of tenure on net worth is positive, rather large and significant
(p < .005) in all countries. This finding is in line with previous research,
arguing that homeowners accumulate more wealth than tenants. Second,
TWG’s are larger in the Mediterranean countries, and smaller in the Western
European and German-speaking countries. Figure 1 shows that in 2011
homeowners own between 25 and 45 the net worth of tenants in
Greece, Spain and Italy. In Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands and Germany
the ratio between homeowners and tenants regarding net worth is smallest
(between 10 and 20 the net worth of tenants). We argue this is the
result of the importance of outright, family-owned housing in the
Mediterranean housing regime, allowing a larger share of households with
a relatively low socio-economic status to obtain outright homeownership –
consequently, only the poorest households rent. Third, when we express
the TWG as a ‘controlled ratio’ (the effect size of the effect of homeowner-
ship on net worth - see above), the TWG is strongly reduced in all countries
under observation. This is the ‘net’ effect of housing tenure, representing
the financial outcome of tenure choice, ceteris paribus. Interestingly, the
ordering of TWG’s from low to high is quite similar to the previously pre-
sented ratio. Again, Figure 1 shows that the TWG is smallest in Western-
European and German-speaking countries such as the Netherlands,
Belgium, Austria and Germany (between 2,5 and 4). The largest tenure
wealth gaps are still to be found in the Mediterranean countries (between
4,5 and 6). These results point out that homeowners have much more
wealth (10 – 45) than tenants in all countries under observation, but
that only a limited share can be explained by their tenure choice. Generally
speaking, homeowners are a priori in a better position to accumulate
wealth due to other characteristics (such as their labour market position or
family background). Nevertheless, after thoroughly controlling for different
forms of (social) selection, the effect of tenure remains and has a significant
impact on the wealth accumulation of homeowners. On the basis of their
tenure choice, homeowners accumulate between 3 and 6 more wealth
than tenants.
Figure 2 shows that tenure financial wealth gaps (hereafter TFWG’s) are
much smaller than TWG’s across the board. Although the results are not
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significant for all countries, homeowners generally accumulate more financial
wealth holdings than tenants. On the basis of the ratio’s presented in Figure
2 we conclude that the largest ratio between tenants and homeowners in
terms of financial wealth gap is found in Finland, and Spain (between 3,5
and 5), the smallest in the Netherlands and Greece. It is remarkable that the
differences between countries are more pronounced when the ‘controlled
ratio’ (see above) is taken into account. Small and/or non-significant effects
(p> .05, shaded) can be found in Germany, France, Austria and Portugal.
Slightly larger TFWG’s can be found in Italy, the Netherlands and Finland. The
controlled ratios for Belgium, Greece and Spain are larger, but non-significant.
Interestingly, countries with large TWG’s seem to be characterised by large
TFWG’s as well. Therefore, we conclude that the tenure wealth gap is the
result of homeowners having higher levels of housing wealth than tenants
have financial wealth in some countries, whereas homeowners have higher
levels of financial wealth than tenants in other countries as well.
Explaining the tenure wealth gap
This paper aims to explain why tenure wealth gaps are larger in some coun-
tries and smaller in others. We are unable to draw any conclusions about
individual-level factors that might be related to the accumulation of wealth
as a consequence the propensity score matching procedure that allows us to
carry out a ‘quasi-experiment’. In our analysis sample, every tenant is linked
to a similar homeowner to better control for unobserved ‘latent’ characteris-
tics that determine moves into homeownership. As a natural consequence,
the variance in variables that are used to match tenants to homeowners
(such as income, education, age, marital status, immigrant status and the
receipt of a financial gift) is limited. Table 2 shows the effect of tenure on net
Table 2. Country-fixed-effects regression analysis of the effect of housing tenure on
net worth and financial wealth.
Net worth Financial wealth
Model 1 Model 2
Tenure
Rental (ref.)
Mortgaged ownership 3.123 –0.67
Outright ownership 4.789 2.073





Note: p< 0.001, p< 0.005, p< 0.05. The following variables are used in the propensity score
matching procedure and as control variables in the analysis and are left out as they have no sub-
stantive meaning: income, education, age, marital status, immigrant status, receipt of a financial gift
and ownership of secondary properties.
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worth and financial wealth, after the PSM procedure and inclusion of the
matching variables (not reported as they have no substantive meaning). The
overall effect of tenure is the outcome of a country-fixed-effects model in
which we control for all unobserved heterogeneity at the macro-level.
Model 1 confirms that mortgaged homeowners and outright homeowners
have higher levels of net worth than otherwise-similar tenants, across our ten
countries. Furthermore, it confirms that outright owners have higher levels of
net worth than mortgaged owners, as part of the home is ‘owned by the
bank’. Model 2 shows that mortgaged homeowners do not significantly differ
from tenants in terms of financial wealth holdings. This means that the
higher level of net worth of mortgaged homeowners compared to tenants, is
mainly the result of their housing wealth holdings. This result is not surpris-
ing as the interest that households pay on their mortgage is generally higher
than the interest rate than households receive on their bank accounts. As a
result, the wealth portfolio of mortgaged homeowners is heavy on housing.
This underlines that during the period of mortgage amortisation, housing
wealth crowds out financial wealth. However, the attractiveness of savings
for mortgaged homeowners is strongly dependent on national housing poli-
cies and mortgage market regulations, such as the availability of mortgage
interest-mortgage deduction schemes or interest-only loans. Outright home-
owners have significantly higher levels of financial wealth than tenants. This
is not surprising, as after the amortisation of the mortgage, the accumulation
of housing wealth is just the result of house price gains, which does not
demand a long-term financial sacrifice at the expense of the accumulation of
financial wealth. Altogether, Model 1 explains 38% of the total variance in
net worth, whereas model 2 explains 12% of the total variance in financial
wealth. The difference in R-squared for both models shows that differences
in net worth between renters and owners are clearly mostly (and, in fact,
almost by definition) linked to the housing assets of different categories of
owners (hence a rather ‘too high’ explained variance of 38%). With regard to
financial wealth, tenure has a much smaller impact – bearing in mind that
most of the ‘initial’ differences (related to social selection) between owners
and tenants have been controlled for already through the matching proced-
ure. When evaluated from this perspective, 12% explained variance (based
on individual-level data) is still a fairly large number.
Explaining the gap: Institutional differences
We next explain cross-country variation regarding the size of the (1) tenure
wealth gap (TWG) and (2) tenure financial wealth gap (TFWG) by including
cross-level interactions between housing tenure (rental versus homeowner-
ship) and several macro-level institutional variables in the country-fixed-
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effects models presented in Table 2. Table 3 (Model 3 a and b) summarise
the results of the addition of each of the institutional characteristics to
Model 2 separately. For each of the cross-level interactions, we show the
main effect of tenure, the R-squared and the number of observations. In
Table 4 (Model 4 a and b), the same procedure is repeated whilst addition-
ally controlling for the cross-level interaction with homeownership rate in
the country.
The first cross-level interaction describes the effect of the homeowner-
ship rate on the size of the TWG (Model 3.1a) and the TFWG (Model 3.1b).
Model 3.1a and 3.1b show that the tenure wealth gap is larger in countries
with higher homeownership rates. This matches the findings from Figure 1,
in which the largest tenure wealth gaps are found in Mediterranean coun-
tries with nearly universal homeownership; in these countries the ‘left-over’
renters are comparatively worst off. The first cross-level interaction is added
to all the subsequent cross-level interactions in Model 4a and 4 b, to control
for the expansion of homeownership during the post-war period. By doing
so, we are able to distil the effect of various strategies of homeowner-
ship expansion.
Three cross-level interactions describe the nature of homeownership
promotion. Cross-level interaction 3.2a and 3.2b shows the effect of tax-
ation of homeownership on the TWG and the TFWG. Contrary to our
expectations, no significant results are found. We argue that 1) the histor-
ical taxation of homeownership might better represent the context in
which many current homeowners have bought their home, and 2) countries
with relatively high taxes on homeownership might still promote home-
ownership if rental housing is (relatively speaking) more expensive, or 3)
when subsidy schemes or fiscal advantages are available for homeowners.
The ‘outcome’ of the historical promotion of homeownership, the penetra-
tion of owner-occupancy in lower income groups, coincides with larger ten-
ure wealth gaps (Cross-level interaction 3.3a), even after controlling for the
homeownership rate (cross-level interaction 4.2a). This means that, even in
countries with relatively high homeownership rates, the structure of home-
ownership matters. The TWG is larger where lower income groups are over-
represented in homeownership because they use additional means on top
of their income to access this tenure, such as state subsidies or family help
(financial support, inheritance, labour power). Model 3.3b shows that the
TFWG is larger in countries when households from the lowest income dec-
iles are overrepresented in homeownership. However, this effect does not
remain after controlling for the homeownership rate (Model 4.2b). Loan-to-
value ratios measure the promotion of homeownership through the liberal-
isation of housing finance. Cross-level interaction 3.4 shows the effect of
the loan-to-value ratio on the TWG (Model a) and the TFWG (Model b). The
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results indicate that the TWG is smaller in countries with higher loan-to-value
ratios (Model 3.4a), even after controlling for the homeownership rate in the
country (Model 4.3a). The deregulation of housing finance has reduced interest
rates and inflated house prices, the latter being compensated by a prolonga-
tion of the loan term. This has resulted in capital gains for sitting homeowners,
but increased indebtedness among newer homeowners. Contrary to countries
where homeownership is promoted through state subsidies or with family
help, in countries with liberal housing finance, home-owning households in
lower socio-economic strata ‘rent from the bank’, which results in a smaller
difference between renting and home-owning households in terms of net
worth. The first three cross-level interactions provide mixed evidence for
hypothesis 1, indicating that the promotion of homeownership enlarges tenure
wealth gaps. Generally, this hypothesis holds, except for cases in which home-
ownership is encouraged in a financialised way.
The next two cross-level interactions describe the effect of rental regula-
tions on the size of the tenure wealth gap and the tenure financial wealth
gap. Cross-level interaction 3.5 and 3.6 show that the size of the social ren-
tal sector has a negative impact on the TWG (Model 3.5a), whereas the
negative effect on the TFWG is not significant (Model 3.5b). This means that
the tenure wealth gap is smaller in countries with a larger social housing
sector. After controlling for the homeownership rate in the country (Model
4.4a), the effect on the TWG remains (however, only significant at the
p< .10-level). The lower significance level is not surprising, as larger social
housing sectors exist in countries with lower homeownership rates.
Through reduced rents, social renters have the opportunity to accumulate
financial wealth, and catch up with their counterparts in homeownership.
However, affordable housing is not in all countries the sole domain of social
housing. Therefore, cross-level interaction six describes the effect of the
average rent-to-income ratio (a measure of affordability) on the size of the
TWG and the TFWG. The results indicate that unaffordable rental housing is
associated with larger TWGs (Model 3.6a, significant at the p< .10-level)
and TFWGs (Model 3.6b). In countries such as Germany and Austria, where
rent-setting is regulated, tenants spend a smaller share of their income on
rent, which allows them to save. This in turn, reduces the difference
between tenants and homeowners with similar characteristics in terms of
wealth. The cross-level interactions describing the structure of the rental
sector provide strong evidence for hypothesis 2, stating that affordable
(social) rental housing is associated with smaller tenure wealth gaps and
tenure financial wealth gaps.
The final three cross-level indicators describe the generosity of the
welfare state. Cross-level interaction 3.7 shows the impact of the size of
state-mandated pension funds on the TWG (Model a) and the TFWG (Model
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b), as pension wealth might crowd out housing wealth. No significant
results are found. We argue that this is the case because the relationship
between housing and depends on the coverage of the pension schemes
and their organising principles. Only in case of voluntary participation in
(state-mandated) second-tier pension funds there can be a trade-off
between housing wealth and housing wealth (passive asset-based welfare
and pro-active asset-based welfare) (Delfani, De Deken, & Dewilde, 2014;
Ronald et al., 2017). In conservative welfare states, with fragmented pension
coverage, the trade-off might occur for poorly covered sub-populations
only (see Wind & Dewilde, 2018). As the HFCS does not contain information
about pension wealth at the household level, it is impossible to provide
reliable evidence on the above-mentioned trade-off. Cross-level interaction
3.8 describes the effect of unemployment benefit generosity on the TWG
(Model 3.8a) and the TFWG (Model 3.8b). The negative effect of unemploy-
ment benefit generosity on net worth shows that the TWG is smaller in
countries with a more generous welfare state, even after controlling for the
homeownership rate in the country (Model 4.7a). We did not find a signifi-
cant effect on the TFWG (Model 4.7b). We propose two explanations. First,
homeowners accumulate less housing wealth in countries with more gener-
ous unemployment benefits because they are less in need of assets as wel-
fare arrangement of last resort. Second, tenants accumulate more financial
wealth in countries with more generous unemployment benefits because
social risks are collectively mitigated rather than individually. Cross-level inter-
action 3.9 confirms that countries in which welfare-related taxes and contri-
butions (paid by the employers and the employee) represent a larger share
of the national income, both TWGs (Model 3.9a) and TFWGs (Model 3.9b) are
smaller, even after controlling for the homeownership rate (Model 4.8a and
4.8b). First, the higher (and progressive) tax levels needed to finance gener-
ous social security arrangements might hamper wealth accumulation (among
homeowners in the higher income strata). Second, generous social security
arrangements reduce the need for asset-based welfare, and reduce the
chance that savings will evaporate as a consequence of periods out of
labour. Altogether, the final three cross-level interactions provide mixed evi-
dence for hypothesis 3. Tenure wealth gaps are smaller in countries with
more generous collective social security arrangements. However, due to data
restrictions, the connection with the pension system remains unclear.
Conclusion
Homeownership is associated with higher levels of net worth (housing and
financial wealth minus (residential) debts) and financial wealth (Belsky et al.,
2007; Di et al., 2007; Haurin et al., 2002). In this paper, the effect of
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homeownership on wealth accumulation is captured by the ‘tenure wealth
gap’, which indicates the difference regarding net worth between tenants
and homeowners with similar characteristics. Tenure wealth gaps are the
result of (1) an overrepresentation of individuals with the ‘right’ characteris-
tics and predispositions for wealth accumulation in homeownership, and
(2) government regulations, policies, and subsidies that favour homeowner-
ship over rental housing/increase the need of housing assets for welfare
provisioning. Our analysis boils down to a quasi-experiment that controls
for the first mechanism behind the tenure wealth gap by transforming the
sample on the basis of a propensity score matching procedure that couples
every tenant to a similar homeowner. Our analyses therefore shed more
light on the second mechanism, by investigating the impact of several insti-
tutional characteristics on the size of the tenure wealth gap. The import-
ance of the second mechanism varies across Europe, as various countries
have promoted homeownership in a different way.
Our findings indicate that, studying a sample of households headed by
persons older than 35 years old in 10 European countries, homeownership
is indeed associated with higher levels of net worth and financial wealth.
This is the case even a few years after the Global Financial Crisis, and after
intensive controls for the selection bias on the household level. Whilst
housing wealth and financial wealth seem to operate like communicating
vessels in the initial phase of mortgage amortisation, homeowners and ten-
ants grow apart over time due 1) higher saving rates resulting from low
housing costs after mortgage amortisation, and 2) higher returns on their
investment as a result of house price inflation.
The tenure wealth gap shows considerable cross-country variation. The
largest tenure wealth gaps are found in Mediterranean countries, such as
Greece, Spain and Italy. The smallest tenure wealth gaps are to be found in
Western-European countries such as Belgium, Germany, Austria and the
Netherlands. The pattern of tenure wealth gaps in Europe is partly caused
by institutional differences between countries. We point at three factors.
First, in countries where a large share of lower-income households is able
to enter homeownership due to state subsidies or family help, the tenure
wealth gap is larger (Hypothesis 1a). In these countries, homeowners with
limited incomes have been able to accumulate housing wealth beyond the
purchasing power their income allows them to exercise on ‘the market’.
Marginalised tenants, at the other hand, are barely able to save. When
homeownership is promoted in a financialised manner, the tenure wealth
gap is limited due to the large residential debts among homeowners (and
the relatively strong financial position of the large group of social tenants
in these countries) (Hypothesis 1b). Second, in countries with more afford-
able (social) rental housing, the tenure wealth gap is smaller because
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tenants have a larger share of their income left after paying their rent,
which allows them to save (Hypothesis 2). Finally, our results indicate that
more generous collective social security arrangements reduce tenure
wealth gaps, as stable incomes and a safety net in times of economic adver-
sity allow tenants to accumulate wealth, whereas they reduce the import-
ance of housing assets in the provisioning of welfare for homeowners
(contradictory to Hypothesis 3a). Although we expect these theoretically-
derived empirical patterns of relationships to hold should more liberal and
social-democratic welfare states be included in the analyses, unfortunately
these countries were not included in our sample. This therefore remains to
be answered by future research.
The organisation of the welfare state and the promotion of homeowner-
ship are linked. We point at the existence of two models. First, there are
Mediterranean and Western-European welfare states (amongst others: Italy,
Belgium and France) in which passive asset-based welfare is the golden
route towards wellbeing in later life as small welfare second-tier state-
mandated pensions are not generous enough to cater for all welfare needs
(passive asset-based welfare). In previous times, familialistic5 and state-
sponsored models of housing provisioning allowed households with lower
labour market incomes to take part in this golden route, resulting in large
tenure wealth gaps as marginalised tenants could not save to the same
extent as homeowners could accumulate housing wealth. In countries with
a more market-based provisioning of homeownership, the gap is smaller
because the share of low-income homeowners is smaller, not because ten-
ants accumulate more financial wealth. Second, there are North-Western
European countries that combine relatively generous welfare state arrange-
ments with a financialised promotion of homeownership. Lennartz and
Ronald (2017) point out that the implementation of social investment strat-
egies in these generous welfare states paves the road for forms of active
asset-based welfare. Due to the spread of mortgaged homeownership, ten-
ure wealth gaps are relatively small (Hypothesis 3b). However, the tenure
wealth gap might grow in the coming years because the financialised pro-
motion of homeownership has inflated house prices and it becomes more
difficult to enter the market for outsiders without intergenerational trans-
fers. Housing wealth inequality among homeowners in these countries is
among the largest in Europe (Wind et al., 2017).
Countries that are characterised by passive asset-based welfare generally
have larger tenure wealth gaps than countries that are characterised by
active asset-based welfare. However, it would be wrong to conclude that
promoting homeownership in a financialised fashion and propagating
active asset-based welfare would alleviate the problems associated with
large tenure wealth gaps (reduced availability and affordability of
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homeownership and limited wealth accumulation among tenants) as both
strategies inflate house prices. The results point at a more promising route
to alleviate the problems associated with large tenure wealth gaps: an
enlargement of the affordable (social) housing sector. This allows tenants to
accumulate savings, whereas it does not inflate house prices. More import-
antly, increasing security for tenants (e.g. by installing parallel arrangements
providing welfare for tenants, tenure security, or affordability) might
decrease the necessity to participate in the rat race to accumulate housing
assets, as they cannot participate in the dominant mode of asset-based wel-
fare in their country (passive, active or pro-active).
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Notes
1. Whereas first-tier pensions are mainly aimed at reducing poverty during old age,
second-tier pensions are aimed at maintaining the working-life income (De
Deken, 2017).
2. Pay-As-You-Go pension systems use the pension contributions of the current cohort of
workers to finance the pensions of the retired population. In funded pension systems,
a cohort of workers saves for their own pensions after retirement.
3. The imputed income is the difference between actual housing costs and market rent
for the same dwelling, and can be considered as an income in-kind.
4. Note that the higher score for unemployment benefit generosity for Belgium is thanks
to the near-‘indefinite’ duration of entitlement, as employment benefits themselves
only provide a comparatively low level of income replacement.
5. Familialistic models of housing provision are common in countries (mainly Southern-
and Eastern-European) where state provision of welfare arrangements is low and
where extended families commonly support redistribution of housing and other
welfare resources, including in the form of housing. In these countries family housing
wealth is an important dimension of income in later life, commonly referred to as a
‘pension in stone’ that benefits different generations of the extended family. In
western homeownership nations where homeownership is promoted by the state,
homeownership is also important as a source of welfare in later life, but typically
benefits immediate household members rather than extended families.
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